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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine writing a check to a local non-profit organization only to discover
months later that the government has used your charitable deed to revoke your
United States citizenship. The group to which you made an innocent donation has
been labeled a terrorist organization and your check is considered “providing
material support” to a terrorist group. Imagine further that your contribution is used
as prima facie evidence establishing your intent to renounce your United States
citizenship. This evidence is then used to strip you of your citizenship and leave you
stateless in your own country. This may seem extreme, but if a proposed legislation
593
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entitled the “Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003” becomes law, this
seemingly outlandish scenario will become a very real and frightening possibility.
On February 7, 2003, a confidential draft of this proposed legislation, the
“Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,” more commonly known as “Patriot
Act II,” was released to the public by the Center for Public Integrity.1 This proposed
legislation was drafted by the staff of Attorney General John Ashcroft and sent to
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert and Vice President Richard Cheney on January
10, 2003.2 Up until this draft was leaked to the Center for Public Integrity, the
Justice Department denied that any such legislation was even being planned.3 If
passed, this proposed Patriot Act II will effect a bold, sweeping expansion of the
USA Patriot Act passed in the wake of September 11, 2001.4 The original USA
Patriot Act was passed on October 26, 2001, just six weeks after the terrorist
attacks.5 The USA Patriot Act, which passed with little debate, provided for major
changes to federal criminal, immigration, banking, and intelligence law in the name
of anti-terrorism.6 These changes have led critics to question whether the balance
between liberty and security has been thrown off kilter.7 Patriot Act II seeks to
extend the government’s power to limit civil liberties even further.8
Section 501 of Patriot Act II, which threatens Americans’ citizenship, is among
the most alarming provisions of this draft legislation.9 Section 501, entitled
“Expatriation of Terrorists,” provides for denationalization of citizens if the
government determines that they have joined or provided material support to terrorist
organizations.10 Further, Section 501 takes the unprecedented action of declaring
that involvement with a terrorist group would be prima facie evidence of intent to
1

Charles Lewis & Adam Mayle, Special Report: Justice Dept. Drafts Sweeping Expansion
of Anti-Terrorism Act: Center Publishes Secret Draft of ‘Patriot II’ Legislation (Feb. 7, 2003)
at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportID=502&L1=10&L2=10&L3=0&L4
=0&L5=0 (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
2
See Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, draft Jan. 9, 2003 at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/downloads/Story_01_020703_Doc_1.pdf (last visited
Feb. 19, 2004).
3

See Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1.

4

See id.

5

See id.

6

See Donald A. Downs & Erik Kinnunen, Symposium Issue: Civil Liberties in a Time of
Terror: Article: A Response to Anthony Lewis: Civil Liberties in a New Kind of War, 2003
Wis. L. Rev. 385, 387 (2003).
7

See id. at 387.

8

See id. at 388.

9
See Joanne Mariner, Patriot Act II’s Attack on Citizenship: Denationalization as
Punishment, CounterPunch, March 8, 2003, at http://www.counterpunch.org/
mariner03082003.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
10
See Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, Section 501, 78-79, draft, Jan. 9, 2003
at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/downloads/Story_01_020703_Doc_1.pdf.
(last
visited Feb. 19, 2004) [hereinafter “Patriot Act II”].
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relinquish citizenship.11 Section 501 of Patriot Act II will extend the government’s
power and threaten not just loss of civil liberties, but loss of citizenship itself.12
Citizenship is viewed as “man’s basic right for it is nothing less than the right to
have rights.”13 The Constitution protects this most fundamental right by prohibiting
the government from denationalizing citizens without their consent.14 The Supreme
Court has held that involuntary denationalization of citizens is prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment.15 Further, the Court has held that use of denationalization
as punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual
punishment.16 Section 501 of Patriot Act II, as proposed, violates both of these
constitutional protections of citizenship by reinstating the government’s power to
denationalize citizens as a punishment for involvement with alleged terrorist
organizations regardless of a person’s intent to relinquish citizenship.
This Note will examine the rise and fall of denationalization in the United States
and argue that Section 501 of Patriot Act II, which seeks to revive denationalization
by amending the Immigration and Nationality Act, will be unconstitutional if passed
by Congress in its present form. Part II of this Note will examine the history of
denationalization in the United States. The development of expatriation legislation
shows an early confusion of the status of citizenship and the right of a citizen to
expatriate himself. Judicial response to this legislation shows an initial deference to
Congress allowing for denationalization of citizens. Eventually, however, the
Supreme Court recognized the constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to
revoke citizenship and established the basic principle that all United States citizens
have the right to remain citizens unless they voluntarily relinquish this right.
Part III explores in detail the proposed amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act in Section 501 of Patriot Act II that provide for a revival of
denationalization. This section also discusses the potential for abuses that may result
if this legislation is enacted, as suggested by several critics of Patriot Act II,
including the use of denationalization against citizens who are members of groups
that express unpopular political views or even using denationalization as a way to
detain individuals indefinitely once they have lost their rights as citizens.
Part IV discusses why Patriot Act II is an unconstitutional attempt to strip
Americans of their citizenship, rather than a way to protect our country from
terrorism. This section focuses on the constitutional protections provided for
citizenship by the Fourteenth Amendment, and emphasizes Patriot Act II’s attempt to
overcome these protections through eliminating the government’s burden to prove a
citizen’s intent to renounce citizenship by a preponderance of evidence. Part IV also
analyzes Section 501 of Patriot Act II’s use of denationalization as a punishment
which has been held unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. This analysis
emphasizes the value of citizenship to individuals and explores the potential for

11

See id.

12

See generally Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9.

13

See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).

14

See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).

15

Id. at 268.

16

See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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statelessness that would result from denationalization under Patriot Act II.
In
conclusion, this Note recommends that if presented with Patriot Act II, Congress
should reject this proposed legislation because of its unconstitutional attempt to
revive denationalization.
II. HISTORY OF DENATIONALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The history of denationalization17 and expatriation18 in the United States shows a
movement toward prohibiting the government from revoking citizenship unless the
citizen himself manifests an intention to terminate citizenship.19 The Supreme
Court’s examination of the constitutional limits on the power of Congress to enact
expatriation legislation has founded the principle that “forcible destruction of
citizenship” through denationalization is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.20
This conclusion by the Supreme Court has resolved the confusion between the
protected right of all citizens to expatriate themselves and the prohibited act of
denationalizing citizens regardless of their intent.21 This led to the “consensus that
an American citizen, natural born or naturalized, has a constitutional right to remain
a citizen unless he/she voluntarily assents to relinquish citizenship.”22 An
examination of American expatriation legislation and the Supreme Court’s response
to this legislation shows that Patriot Act II would violate the constitutional protection
of Americans from denationalization by the government.
A. Historical Overview of American Expatriation Legislation
For the first hundred years of United States history, Congress rarely enacted
denationalization legislation.23 In fact, early concerns over loss of citizenship
revolved around expatriation, not denationalization.24
Use of the terms
“expatriation” and “denationalization” as interchangeable concepts in loss of
citizenship law has been a major source of confusion.25 Expatriation is a citizen’s
17

Denationalization is the revocation of citizenship by the government pursuant to statute
regardless of the citizen’s intent. See Elwin Griffith, Expatriation and the American Citizen,
31 HOW. L.J. 453, 459 n.57, 462 n.70 (1988).
18

True expatriation is viewed as a voluntary surrender of citizenship made by the citizen
himself. See id. at 459 n.57, 462 n.70.
19
See Alan G. James, Expatriation in the United States: Precept and Practice Today and
Yesterday, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 853, 854-55 (1990).
20
See Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253; James, supra note 19, at 855 (recognizing the Supreme
Court’s decision in Afroyim as establishing the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits denationalization).
21

See James, supra note 19, at 855.

22

Id.

23

See J.M. Spectar, To Ban or Not to Ban an American Taliban? Revocation of
Citizenship & Statelessness in a Statecentric System, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 281 (2003).
24
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471,
1475 (1986).
25

See Steven S. Goodman, Note, Protecting Citizenship: Strengthening the Intent
Requirement in Expatriation Proceedings, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 341, 344 n.14 (1988).
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voluntary relinquishment of citizenship.26 In contrast, denationalization is “the
forcible divestiture of an individual’s citizenship by the government.”27 Frequently,
the government will use the term expatriation for government actions that are
actually denationalization under the premise that deprivation of citizenship is merely
a formalization of an individual’s voluntary action to renounce citizenship.28
Regardless of the term used, any action of the government to revoke a person’s
citizenship without his assent should be viewed as denationalization.29
In 1868, Congress passed the first Expatriation Act.30 This Act formally
recognized the right of expatriation possessed by all citizens stating that “the right of
expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the
enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”31 The purpose
of this legislation was to protect naturalized U.S. citizens who returned to their native
countries.32 This initial recognition of a right of expatriation for citizens, which was
meant to protect citizens, was eventually used as the basis for the government to
revoke citizenship.33 By establishing that Americans could renounce their allegiance,
this allowed the government to argue that certain objective conduct was evidence of
expatriation and led to further legislation providing for the denationalization of U.S.
citizens.34
Several decades after enacting the first Expatriation Act, Congress passed the
Expatriation Act of 1907, which was the first statute to identify specific acts that
would lead to loss of United States citizenship.35 This Act provided that expatriation
occurred if a citizen was naturalized in, or swore allegiance to, a foreign state, or if a
naturalized citizen resided in a foreign county for a certain length of time.36 The Act
also provided that expatriation occurred for any American woman who married a
foreigner under the theory that a woman takes the nationality of her husband.37 The
26

See id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29
See J.P. Jones, Comment, Limiting Constitutional Denationalization After Afroyim, 17
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 121, 123 n.11 (1979).
30

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 457.

31

See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1475 (quoting Expatriation Act, Ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223
(1868)).
32

See id.

33

See id. at 1476.

34

Id.

35

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 457. In 1906, Congress responded to the problems caused
by a major increase in immigration and naturalization in the United States by establishing a
commission “to examine into the subjects of citizenship, expatriation and protection abroad.”
See James, supra note 19, at 873 (quoting S. Res. 30, 59th Cong. (1st Sess. 1906)). The report
from this commission was used to create the bill that became the Expatriation Act of 1907. Id.
at 874.
36

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 457-58.

37

See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1476.
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main goal of the Act was to deal with the problems of dual nationality; however, it
led to further problems of citizens expatriating themselves without realizing it
because the act defined circumstances in which it would infer an individual’s
assent.38 This caused a shift in focus from an individual’s right of expatriation to
“the government’s right to prescribe the formula for an individual’s loss of
citizenship,” and led to statutory denationalization.39
The Nationality Act of 1940 expanded even further grounds for
denationalization.40 For the first time, Congress included acts that did not involve
the assumption of a new nationality as grounds for loss of American citizenship.41
This legislation provided for loss of citizenship for conduct including: serving in
foreign armed services, voting in a foreign election, accepting certain offices in a
foreign state, being convicted of wartime desertion, and committing treason.42 In
1944, loss of citizenship for leaving the United States during wartime to avoid
military service was added to the list.43 All of these grounds for expatriation were
codified by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.44 This continual extension
of the government’s power over expatriating acts transformed what was meant
initially to be a system recognizing citizens’ voluntary expatriation into involuntary
denationalization of citizens by the government.45
Over the course of their history, these statutes were frequently challenged on
grounds of constitutionality.46 Supreme Court rulings declaring denationalization as
unconstitutional have slowly returned the interpretation of expatriation legislation to
its original intent – a method for individuals to voluntarily renounce their citizenship,
not to have it forcibly taken away by the government.47 In response to the Supreme
38

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 458.

39

Id.

40

See Spectar, supra note 23, at 281.

41

Leonard B. Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Nationality, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1510,
1513 (1960). It is important to note that the terms “nationality” and “citizenship” are often
regarded as synonymous and are both used to describe a person’s membership in their country.
See P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (1956).
42

See Spectar, supra note 23, at 281.

43

See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1477.

44

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 459.

45
See Boudin, supra note 41, at 1514. Boudin states that the process of the government
transforming voluntary expatriation into denationalization is marked by three significant
tendencies: (1) The continuous expansion of the number of acts deemed evidence of so-called
voluntary expatriation. (2) A shift from rebuttable presumption and temporary suspension to
conclusive acts with permanent effect. (3) The change of the basic standard so as to infer an
intent to expatriate from conduct not involving a transfer of allegiance to another country. Id.
at 1514-15.
46

See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) (challenging the expatriation of
women who marry foreigners as provided in the 1907 Act); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44
(1958) (challenging provision that authorized expatriation for citizen that had voted in foreign
election); Trop, 356 U.S. 86 (challenging expatriation for wartime desertion).
47

See James, supra note 19, at 854-55.
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Court’s decisions, the most current version of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
amended in 1987, expressly states that a citizen can only lose his citizenship if he
performs an expatriating act voluntarily with the intent to relinquish United States
citizenship.48 Through this amendment Congress has brought the statute into
conformity with the Constitution and officially recognized that the government does
not have the authority to involuntarily denationalize citizens.49 Ignoring the
unconstitutionality of denationalization, Patriot Act II seeks to amend this statute and
reassert the government’s power to strip people of their citizenship.50
B. Judicial Response to Congress’ Efforts to Denationalize Citizens
Congressional enactment of these “expatriation” statutes led the Supreme Court
to examine the constitutionality of denationalization.51 The initial uncertainty about
the right of expatriation led to confusion between intentional expatriation by citizens
and involuntary denationalization of citizens by the government.52 The Supreme
Court was faced with the question of whether Congress has the power to determine
through legislation which voluntary acts of citizens will result in their expatriation.53
Early Supreme Court decisions show that the Court was very deferential to Congress
and sustained most of the early denationalization statutes.54 However, the Supreme
Court gradually began to restrict the power of Congress during the 1950’s and
1960’s, and struck down many expatriation statutes as unconstitutional.55 A review
of the major Supreme Court decisions on expatriation and denationalization shows a
movement towards the recognition that the Constitution protects the right of
citizenship and Congress is “powerless to take away a person’s citizenship without
[that] person’s assent.”56
1. Initial Judicial Deference to Congress
Early judicial acceptance of denationalization of citizens by the government is
demonstrated by Mackenzie v. Hare,57 which tested the Expatriation Act of 1907.58

48
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2003). The current Immigration and Nationality Act only provides
for seven specific acts of expatriation. Id.
49

See David A. Martin, Comment, The Civic Republican Ideal for Citizenship, and for Our
Common Life, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 301, 313 (1994).
50

See Mariner, supra note 9.

51

See Spectar, supra note 23, at 282.

52

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 459. The confusion between expatriation and
denationalization can be traced back to the common law doctrine of perpetual allegiance,
which was rejected by the 1868 Expatriation Act. Id. at 459-60.
53

Id. at 460.

54

See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1478.

55

See James, supra note 19, at 855.

56

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 468.

57

239 U.S. 299 (1915).

58

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 458.
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Mackenzie was a native born U.S. citizen who lost her citizenship by marrying a
foreigner under the act.59 She challenged the act claiming that the Constitution
protected her right to citizenship and that the Constitution did not provide Congress
the express power of expatriation.60 The Supreme Court upheld the right of
Congress to denationalize citizens, concluding that this was an implied power that
was necessary to the express power of protecting U.S. sovereignty.61 This decision
shows the Court’s early disregard of the intent of a citizen to retain citizenship.62
The Court focused on the voluntary act of marrying a foreigner, and concluded that
taking such action with notice of the consequences could be used to establish
expatriation regardless of whether there was an actual intent to relinquish
citizenship.63
In 1958, the issue of denationalization was again faced by the Supreme Court in
two major cases that show a shift in the Court’s view of denationalization. The first
case, Perez v. Brownell,64 was a controversial decision by a divided Court that
continued the trend of judicial deference to Congress. The Court held that the
Nationality Act of 1940 authorized Congress to strip a person of his citizenship for
voting in a foreign election or remaining outside the United States to avoid military
service, regardless of whether the person intended to relinquish his citizenship.65
Perez was a native-born U.S. citizen who moved with his parents to Mexico and
remained there to avoid military service during World War II.66 When he sought to
reenter the United States as a citizen, he admitted that he had avoided military
service and also that he had voted in political elections in Mexico.67 Based on these
admissions, Perez was deemed to have expatriated himself and he was deported.68
The majority in Perez reiterated the idea that Congress had the power to
denationalize citizens based on the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution.69 The Court reasoned that Congress has the power to deal with foreign
affairs and controlling the withdrawal of citizenship may be necessary to avoid
embarrassment in foreign relations.70 With this deferral to the power of Congress,71

59

Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 306-07.

60

Id. at 308, 310.

61

Id. at 311-12.

62

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 458 (discussing the Court’s deference to Congress’s
inherent power of sovereignty and the lack of a statutory requirement for a citizen to intend to
relinquish citizenship).
63

Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 311-12.

64

356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).

65

Perez, 356 U.S. at 61-62.

66

Id. at 46.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 46-47.

69

Id. at 60-62.

70

Id. at 59-60.
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the Court overtly rejected the idea that a citizen’s intent should be considered, stating
that “it would be a mockery of this Court’s decisions to suggest that a person, in
order to lose his citizenship, must intend or desire to do so.”72
Chief Justice Warren wrote an important dissent in Perez that would lay the
foundation for future Supreme Court decisions rejecting the power of Congress to
denationalize citizens.73 The Chief Justice condemned denationalization as “not
within the letter or the spirit of the powers with which our Government was
endowed” and firmly concluded that the government is without power to revoke the
citizenship of any American, native-born or naturalized.74 Chief Justice Warren
drew this conclusion from the Fourteenth Amendment protection of citizenship for
all people born or naturalized in the United States.75 This amendment provides a
constitutional right of citizenship and the Constitution does not provide any
corresponding provision authorizing divestment of citizenship by the government.76
Consequently, the Chief Justice pronounced that the Constitution prohibits Congress
from revoking citizenship without assent from the individual.77
2. Judicial Recognition of the Unconstitutionality of Denationalization
The second major case in 1958 to address denationalization, Trop v. Dulles,78
shows the beginning of judicial recognition that Congress is prohibited by the
Constitution from revoking citizenship involuntarily. Trop v. Dulles was decided on
same day as Perez v. Brownell, but the outcome was very different.79 Trop was a
soldier who was convicted of desertion during World War II.80 Several years later
when he applied for a passport, he was notified that he had lost his citizenship as a

71
This deferral to Congress was based on the “longstanding belief that Congress could
both define expatriation acts and compel an individual to accept the consequences of
committing any of these acts.” See Goodman, supra note 25, at 344.
72

Perez, 356 U.S. at 61.

73

Perez, 356 U.S. at 62 (Warren, C.J. dissenting). See also Goodman, supra note 25, at
344 (recognizing the prominence of Chief Justice Warren’s dissent in future cases).
74

Perez, 356 U.S. at 77-78 (Warren, C.J. dissenting).

75

Id. at 65-66. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “All persons born or naturalized
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76

Perez, 356 U.S. at 65-66 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).

77

Id. Chief Justice Warren emphasized that the right of voluntary expatriation remains a
natural and inherent right of all people. Id. at 66-67.
78

356 U.S. 86.

79

A third case involving the Nationality Act of 1940, Nishikawa v. Dulles, was also
decided on the same day as Trop and Perez, however, this case did not address the
constitutionality of denationalization, rather it addressed the burden of proof required for
expatriation. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958). In Nishikawa, the Court held that the
government bears the burden to prove that an expatriating act was voluntarily performed by
clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. Id. at 135.
80

Trop, 356 U.S. at 87-88.
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result of his desertion under the Nationality Act of 1940.81 In this case, Chief Justice
Warren, who had strongly dissented in Perez, wrote the majority opinion.82 The
Court held that stripping a person of his citizenship as punishment for wartime
desertion was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because
denationalization is a form of cruel and unusual punishment.83
In Trop, Chief Justice Warren expanded on his views of citizenship as a
fundamental right that cannot be revoked by the government.84 He stated, “It is my
conviction that citizenship is not subject to the general powers of the National
Government and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those powers.”85 The
opinion then went on to recognize the removal of Trop’s citizenship as a punishment
for his desertion, because there was no other legitimate purpose for the statute other
than to punish.86 The Court concluded that denationalization is a cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment and is, therefore, unconstitutional.87 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the value of citizenship and the
potential for rendering individuals stateless which would essentially destroy a
person’s political existence.88
The Court completely reversed the view of Congressional denationalization it
espoused in Perez just nine years later in Afroyim v. Rusk.89 In Afroyim, the Court
held that Congress has no power under the Constitution to strip a person of
citizenship unless the person voluntarily relinquishes citizenship.90 The petitioner in

81

Id. at 88.

82

Id. at 87. Justice Brennan proved to be the pivotal vote in this decision because he
changed his position from that of the majority in Perez. In his concurring opinion, he found
that the statute was unconstitutional because he could not see a connection between the statute
and a legitimate Congressional purpose under the war power. Id. at 114 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Brennan, however, still supported the Perez majority’s view that Congress did
have the power to denationalize citizens. Trop, 356 U.S. at 105-07 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83

Id. at 103. The Eighth Amendment provides that “excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
84

Although Chief Justice Warren’s view was that Congress did not have the power to
revoke citizenship, the majority was still unable to agree on this issue. The majority’s
conclusion was only that Congress could not use denationalization as a punishment. See
Jones, supra note 29, at 136.
85

Trop, 356 U.S. at 92. The Chief Justice also reiterated that a citizen may still voluntarily
relinquish or abandon citizenship by express language or language and conduct that exhibit a
renunciation of citizenship. Id.
86

Id. at 97.

87

Id. at 103.

88

Id. at 101.

89

387 U.S. 253 (1967); see Jones, supra note 29, at 137.

90

Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268. The Court stated:
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to and does, protect every
citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship,
whatever his creed, color or race. Our holding does no more than to give to this
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Afroyim was held by the lower court to have lost his American citizenship for voting
in a foreign election under the same section of the Nationality Act of 1940 that was
held to be constitutional in Perez v. Brownell.91 In reversing the lower court’s
decision, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Perez v. Brownell and adopted
Chief Justice Warren’s dissenting view that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents
Congress from revoking citizenship.92 The Court found that Americans, born or
naturalized in the United States, are granted full citizenship under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and all people retain this citizenship unless they voluntarily relinquish
it.93 Further, the Court stated that the Constitution contains no provision, either
express or implied, granting the Government the power to strip people of their
citizenship.94
The impact of the Afroyim decision on the power of Congress to denationalize
was immense.95 For the first time, the Supreme Court recognized that an inherent
right of citizenship exists for all Americans under the Constitution and denounced
the power of Congress to revoke citizenship without assent of the citizen.96 This
decision has established the view of citizenship and denationalization that is
followed in the United States today.97 Afroyim, however, left one important issue
unresolved regarding the government’s ability to revoke citizenship. Although
Afroyim firmly established that Congress can only strip a person of citizenship if he
voluntarily relinquishes it, this decision failed to address whether such “voluntary
relinquishment” requires a specific intent to relinquish citizenship along with the
voluntary commission of an expatriating act.98 The issue of intent was resolved by
the Supreme Court in Vance v. Terrazas.99
Vance v. Terrazas,100 decided in 1980, involved the expatriation of Laurence
Terrazas, a dual national of the United States and Mexico. While a student in
citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country
unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.
Id.
91

Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 255.

92

Id. at 267-68 (stating that “[b]ecause the Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from
[revoking citizenship], we agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent in the Perez case that
the Government is without power to rob a citizen of his citizenship”).
93

Id. at 262.

94

Id. at 257.

95

See James, supra note 19, at 889. James states that Afroyim was “a watershed in the law
of expatriation. It delineated, probably once and for all, the rights of the citizen and the
powers of Congress with respect to those rights.” Id. at 890.
96

Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268; see also Goodman, supra note 25, at 345-46.

97

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 492.

98

See Goodman, supra note 25, at 346. The Afroyim Court also used the vague term
“assent” to describe voluntary relinquishment which added to the confusion over the exact
nature of “assent” and what it required. See Griffith, supra note 17, at 477.
99

See Goodman, supra note 25, at 347.

100

444 U.S. 252 (1980).
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Mexico, Terrazas applied for a certificate of Mexican nationality, swearing
allegiance to Mexico while expressly renouncing his United States citizenship.101 A
few months later, Terrazas was issued a certificate of loss of nationality after it was
concluded that he had voluntarily renounced his United States citizenship under
Section 349 (a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.102 Terrazas denied
renouncing his citizenship, and through a series of appeals debating the requirement
of specific intent and the burden of proof required to establish such intent, the case
reached the Supreme Court.103
In Terrazas, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Afroyim that every citizen has a
constitutional right to retain his citizenship unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.104
The Court then clarified Afroyim’s use of the term “assent” to describe the
mandatory requirement of voluntariness.105 The Court concluded that “assent” to
loss of citizenship means an intent to relinquish citizenship, thus establishing specific
intent as a necessary element of voluntary expatriation.106 Further, the Court
established that expatriating acts cannot be used as conclusive evidence of specific
intent and there can be no presumption that an act has been performed with the intent
to relinquish citizenship.107 The burden is on the government to prove specific intent
to relinquish citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence.108
Beginning with Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court has recognized constitutional
limits on the power of Congress to denationalize citizens.109 In Afroyim v. Rusk and
Vance v. Terrazas, the Court fully pronounced the principles that citizenship is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, involuntarily revocation of citizenship
through denationalization is unconstitutional, and the government must prove
specific intent to relinquish citizenship in all cases involving expatriation.110 These
decisions have formed the modern basis for United States law on the issue of

101

Id. at 255.

102

Id. at 256.

103

Id. at 256-59. Following the issue of the certificate of loss of nationality by the
Department of State, Terrazas’ case was first reviewed by the Board of Appellate Review of
the Department of State, which affirmed the decision. Id. at 256. Terrazas then brought suit
in federal court, and the District Court concluded that the United States had proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that he had voluntarily renounced his citizenship. Id. at 257.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded holding that the evidentiary standard, as
required by the Constitution, was “clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence” rather than
just a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 257-58. The Secretary of State appealed to the
Supreme Court the issue of whether specific intent must be proved to establish voluntary
expatriation. Id. at 258-59.
104

Id. at 259-60.

105

Id. at 260.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 261, 268.

108

Id. at 268.

109

See 356 U.S. 86.

110

See 387 U.S. 253; 444 U.S. 252.
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denationalization.111 Congress has accepted the constitutional standards expressed in
these cases by incorporating their holdings into the statutory language of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.112 It is in the context of these well established
constitutional principles that the proposed legislation of Section 501 of Patriot Act II
must be viewed.
III. PATRIOT ACT II, SECTION 501: EXPATRIATION OF TERRORISTS – A SUMMARY OF
THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The draft of the proposed Patriot Act II that has been leaked to the public is a
voluminous and incredibly detailed extension of its predecessor, the USA Patriot
Act, which expands the government’s powers in many areas in the name of antiterrorism.113 Tucked deep within the text of this draft is Section 501, entitled
“Expatriation of Terrorists.” Among all of the other sweeping changes in Patriot Act
II, this section could easily be overlooked. A cursory glance at this section may lead
one to believe that it merely provides for another way for people to expatriate
themselves. However, critics of Patriot Act II have called attention to the real
implications of Section 501.114 A thorough examination of Section 501 reveals that it
is actually a veiled attempt by the government to revive denationalization as a
punishment for terrorism under the premise of expatriation.115
Section 501 of Patriot Act II seeks to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act
to include terrorism as an expatriating act.116 Section 349 of the Immigration and
111

See Griffith, supra note 17, at 492.

112

Id.

113

See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.

114

See Timothy H. Edgar, How “Patriot Act 2” Would Further Erode the Basic Checks on
Government Power That Keep America Safe and Free, ACLU 6, Mar. 20, 2003, at
http://www.cdt.org/security/patriot2/030320aclu.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2004); Nat Hentoff,
Ashcroft Out of Control: Ominous Sequel to USA Patriot Act, The Village Voice, Feb. 28,
2003 at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0310/hentoff.php. (last visited Jan. 24, 2004), see
also Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9.
115

See generally Mariner, supra note 9.

116

Patriot Act II, supra note 10. The following is the complete text of Section 501:
Expatriation of Terrorists:
Section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1481) is amended –
(1) by amending subsection (a)(3) to read as follows:
“(3)(A) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if—
“(i) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States;
or
“(ii) such person serves as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer;
or
“(B) joining or serving in, or providing material support (as defined in
section 2339A of title 18, United States Code) to, a terrorist
organization designated under section 212(a)(3) or 219 or designated
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, if the
organization is engaged in hostilities against the United States, its
people, or its national security interests.”; and
(2) by adding at the end of subsection (b) the following: “The voluntary commission
or performance of an act described in subsection (a)(3)(A)(i) or (B) shall be
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Nationality Act, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1481, provides that a person who is a national
of the United States by birth or naturalization shall lose his nationality by voluntarily
performing certain enumerated activities with the intention of relinquishing United
States nationality.117 The list of the seven expatriating acts specified by § 1481
includes: obtaining naturalization in a foreign state;118 taking an oath of allegiance to
a foreign state;119 serving in the armed forces of a foreign state, if the armed forces
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or the person serves as a
commissioned or noncommissioned officer;120 accepting or performing the duties of
a government office of a foreign state;121 making a formal renunciation of United
States nationality in a foreign state;122 making in the United States a formal written
renunciation of nationality if our country is in a state of war;123 or committing an act
of treason against the United States.124
The first amendment proposed in Section 501 is directed specifically at changing
the third expatriating act, serving in the armed forces of a foreign state engaged in
hostilities against the United States. Under Section 501 of Patriot Act II, subsection
(a)(3) of § 1481 would be amended to include as an expatriating act: “joining in, or
providing material support (as defined in section 2339A of title 18, United States
Code) to, a terrorist organization designated under section 213(a)(3) or 219 . . ., if the
organization is engaged in hostilities against the United States, its people, or its
national security interests.”125 Such acts will result in loss of citizenship if performed
voluntarily with intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship.126 Critics of Patriot Act II fear
that its reliance on the over-broad definitions of “terrorist organization” and
“providing material support” as defined by the USA Patriot Act will lead to ordinary
people being labeled as terrorists and facing revocation of their citizenship.127
The USA Patriot Act expanded the definition of “domestic terrorism” to include
any activities that “involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States.”128 This expansive definition covers virtually any
group that participates in violence or destruction of property and could be used
prima facie evidence that the act was done with the intention of relinquishing
United States nationality.”
Id.
117

8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2003).

118

8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1).

119

8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2).

120

8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3).

121

8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4).

122

8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5).

123

8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6).

124

8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7).

125

See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.

126

Id.

127

See Edgar, supra note 114; Hentoff, supra note 114.

128

USA PATRIOT Act 802(a)(5), amending 18 U.S.C. § 2331.
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against domestic political advocacy groups that engage in civil disobedience without
any ties to international terrorism.129 Further, the extensive list of ways to provide
“material support” to a terrorist organization could potentially lead to citizens
unknowingly connecting themselves to a group labeled as such without any real
participation in unlawful activities.130 In continuing the USA Patriot Act’s efforts to
control terrorism within the United States, Patriot Act II creates the potential for
denationalizing citizens who have no ties to any foreign state.
Through its second proposed amendment, Section 501 crosses the line from
merely recognizing terrorism as an additional expatriating act to allowing the
government to denationalize citizens against their will by eliminating the
government’s burden to prove a citizen’s intent to renounce citizenship.131 The
second proposal in Section 501 of Patriot Act II effects a major, and controversial,
change from the current version of the Immigration and Nationality Act by creating a
presumption of intent to relinquish citizenship based solely on a person’s connection
to a terrorist group.132 Section 501 provides that “the voluntary commission or
performance of an [expatriating] act . . . shall be prima facie evidence that the act
was done with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality.”133 An
analysis of the section provided with the draft states that this provision would make
it explicit that “the intent to relinquish nationality need not be manifested in words,
but can be inferred from conduct.”134 This revision contradicts judicial interpretation
of the Immigration and Nationality Act which emphasizes that there can be no
presumption of intent based on conduct alone.135 Section 501 seeks to override the
Supreme Court’s holding that the government bears the heavy burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that a citizen had intent to relinquish citizenship.136
If passed, this unprecedented effort by the government to reassert its power of
denationalization would establish that an act of joining or providing material support
to a group labeled as a “terrorist organization” is prima facie evidence of an intent to

129

See Downs & Kinnunen, supra note 6, at 388; see also Edgar, supra note 114 (stating
that under the overbroad definition of international and domestic terrorism “diverse ‘directaction’ organizations, including Operation Rescue, the World Trade Organization protestors,
and others could conceivably be labeled ‘terrorist organizations’”).
130
18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2003). According to this section, the term “material support or
resources” means currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials. Id.
131

See generally Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9; Hetnoff, supra note

114.
132

Id.

133

See Patriot Act II, supra note 10 (emphasis added).

134

Id.

135

See Goodman, supra note 25, at 355.

136

See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268 (recognizing that presumption of voluntariness does not
create a presumption of intent to expatriate).
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renounce citizenship.137 This has caused great concern among opponents of Patriot
Act II.138 Critics fear the potential for abuse that may occur if this proposal to infer
intent to renounce citizenship from conduct passes. For example, under this new
standard, a person who makes a legitimate contribution to a non-profit organization
could lose his or her citizenship if, even months later, the organization is deemed by
the government to support terrorists.139 All the government would have to do is
prove that the person voluntarily made the donation, not that they did so with the
intent to renounce citizenship.140 Once a person has his citizenship revoked for
joining or providing support to terrorists, the government can treat the person as an
alien and subject him to potentially indefinite detention.141
While the draft of Patriot Act II may be intended to expand its predecessor, the
USA Patriot Act, and increase the protection to Americans from the threat of
terrorism, it would introduce a serious threat to civil liberties.142 As shown by
Section 501, Patriot Act II threatens not only civil liberties, but citizenship itself. A
review of the history of expatriation and denationalization in the United States has
shown that the revival of denationalization proposed by Patriot Act II runs contrary
to the basic constitutional principle pronounced by the Supreme Court in Afroyim
that only citizens themselves can renounce their citizenship.
IV. ANALYSIS: PATRIOT ACT II – UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AND EIGHTH AMENDMENTS
Patriot Act II has revived the dispute over whether Congress has the power under
the Constitution to unilaterally denationalize citizens without their consent.143 This
had been a major source of controversy throughout early American history up until
the decisions of Afroyim and Terrazas.144 In those decisions, the Supreme Court
finally settled the issue by declaring that citizenship is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and Congress has no power to revoke citizenship without citizens’

137

See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.

138

See Hetnoff, supra note 114. Hetnoff poses the question that if intent can be inferred
from conduct, who will do the “inferring?” Id.
139
See Interview by Bill Moyers with Chuck Lewis, Executive Director, Center for Public
Integrity (Feb. 7, 2003) at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_lewis2.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2004).
140

See generally id.; Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Hetnoff, supra note 114.

141

See Edgar, supra note 114 (describing how people who have their citizenship stripped
are placed in “the same position as stateless undocumented immigrants who face potentially
indefinite detention”).
142

See Downs & Kinnunen, supra note 6, at 388.

143

See generally Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9; Hetnoff, supra note

114.
144

See James, supra note 19, at 904 (describing how prior to the Afroyim decision the
expatriation controversy was an ongoing problem and that there was no “clear understanding
of the nature and extent of the power to expatriate American citizens”).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss4/7

16

2004-05]

PATRIOT ACT II AND DENATIONALIZATION

609

voluntary assent.145 Further, in Trop, the Court pronounced that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits using denationalization as a punishment.146 An analysis of
Patriot Act II’s proposal to revoke the citizenship for joining or providing material
support to a terrorist organization, applying the constitutional principles set forth by
the Supreme Court, establishes that if Section 501 of Patriot Act II is enacted it will
be unconstitutional under both the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Protection of Citizens from Attempts
of Government to Revoke Citizenship
The drafters of Patriot Act II have initiated this proposed legislation under the
theory that it is justified by the power to protect Americans and increase homeland
security.147 The Constitution, however, prohibits Congress from granting itself the
power to denationalize in the name of national security.148 First, the Fourteenth
Amendment, as interpreted by Afroyim, grants all native-born or naturalized
Americans citizenship and protects this citizenship from attempts of the government
to revoke it without the assent of the citizen.149 Second, the Constitution does not
expressly grant Congress the power to denationalize citizens or prescribe grounds for
expatriation.150 Further, our federal system of government is based on the theory that
the government is limited to expressly enumerated powers and is prohibited from
implied powers except those necessary to carry out the express powers.151 This has
led to the conclusion that Congress lacks the constitutional power to revoke
citizenship and that expatriation can result only from the voluntary act of the citizen
with the intent to renounce citizenship.152 Any attempts by the government to revoke
145

See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
Following the Court’s clear prohibition against denationalization in the Afroyim and Terrazas
decisions, some believed that “the expatriation chronicle is as close to being finished as it is
likely to be.” See James, supra note 19, at 904.
146

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).

147

In response to the leak of Patriot Act II, the Department of Justice issued a statement
that “[t]he President expects all his cabinet departments that are involved in homeland
security, including the Department of Justice, to make sure we are doing everything we can to
protect the American people . . . . [T]he Department of Justice takes that responsibility
seriously and discusses additional tools to protect the American people.” Statement of
Barbara Comstock, Director of Public Affairs, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/
dtaweb/downloads/Story_01_020703_Doc_3.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
148
See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.” Id.
149

Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253.

150

See John P. Roche, The Loss of American Nationality – The Development of Statutory
Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 26 (1950); Charles Gordon, The Citizen and the State:
Power of Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J. 315, 333 (1964).
151

See Thomas Tin Fah Huang, Loss of United States Citizenship by Expatriation: With
Particular Reference to the Constitutional Aspects 9 (1958) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis,
Harvard Law School) (on file with Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Library).
152

See Gordon, supra note 150, at 333.
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a person’s citizenship against his will is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment.153
The extent of Congress’ authority to control loss of citizenship has been the
major source of dispute throughout the expatriation cases.154 Early attempts to
provide a justification for the power of Congress to denationalize were based on
establishing it as an implied power through the Necessary and Proper clause.155
Proponents of statutory expatriation first claimed that Congress had the power to
denationalize as implied through its power over naturalization.156 The Constitution
provides that Congress shall have the power “to establish an Uniform Rule of
Naturalization.”157 Therefore, it was suggested that the power to grant citizenship
should also infer a power to provide for loss of citizenship.158 This argument was
rejected by early cases that addressed the naturalization power. Chief Justice
Marshall stated in Osborn v. Bank of United States that “the simple power of the
national legislature is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization and the exercise of
this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual.”159 In United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, the Supreme Court denounced the idea that denationalization was implied
through the naturalization power stating that “the power of naturalization, vested in
Congress by the Constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it
away.”160
After the rejection of denationalization as derived from Congress’ naturalization
power, Congress’ asserted power to revoke citizenship was then justified through its
“inherent power of sovereignty” in the area of foreign relations.161 The Supreme
Court initially accepted this as a legitimate basis for upholding statutory
denationalization by Congress.162 In Mackenzie, the Court stated that “[a]s a
government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it
has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those

153

Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253.

154

See Gordon, supra note 150, at 333. Gordon’s article, written prior to Afroyim and
Vance, recognized two opposing views on the issue of Congress’ power to denationalize. Id.
One view rejected Congress’s power while the other implied such a power through the
Necessary and Proper clause. Id.
155

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Necessary and Proper clause provides that
Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” Id. See
also Gordon, supra note 150, at 333.
156

See Roche, supra note 150, at 26.

157

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

158

See Roche, supra note 150, at 26.

159

22 U.S. 738, 827 (1824).

160

169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898).

161

See Roche, supra note 150, at 27.

162

See Mackenzie, 239 U.S. 299; Perez, 356 U.S. 44.
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which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries.”163 The Perez
decision elaborated on the connection between this power of sovereignty in foreign
relations and the power to denationalize through the Necessary and Proper Clause.164
The Court questioned whether “the means, withdrawal of citizenship, [was]
reasonably calculated to effect the end that [was] within the power of Congress to
achieve, the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of our foreign relations.”165
The Court answered affirmatively, bluntly stating that “[t]he termination of
citizenship terminates the problem.”166
The Court’s deference to an implied power of Congress to revoke citizenship has
been replaced by its recognition of the rights of citizens founded in the
Constitution.167 The implied power of Congress to denationalize has now been
wholly rejected by the Supreme Court in light of its interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.168 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States.”169 The Court considered the unequivocal language of this
amendment and concluded that:
There is no indication in these words of a fleeting citizenship, good at the
moment it is acquired but subject to destruction by the Government at any
time. Rather the Amendment can most reasonably be read as defining a
citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.
Once acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship [is] not to be
shifted, canceled or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the
States, or any other governmental unit.170
This express grant of permanent right of citizenship to all native born or
naturalized Americans establishes the principle that only citizens can relinquish their
citizenship and it cannot be forcibly taken away by the government.171
163

Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 311. Although the Court recognized that Congress had power
over citizenship, it conceded that a change of citizenship could not be arbitrarily imposed
without concurrence of the citizen. Id. The Perez decision rejected any requirement of intent
on the part of the citizen and gave full power to denationalize to Congress. Perez, 356. U.S. at
61.
164

Perez, 356 U.S. at 61.

165

Id. at 60.

166
Id. The Court considered the government’s power to regulate foreign affairs to be
broad and applied a “rational nexus” test that would accept Congress’ claim of an implied
power if any reasonable connection to the express power could be drawn. Id. at 58. This
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper clause has been questioned. See Gordon, supra
note 150, at 337 (recognizing that this may raise fears of despotism); Boudin, supra note 41, at
1528 (noting the inconsistency with the view of a government of enumerated powers).
167

See Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253; Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252.

168

See Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253; Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252.

169

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

170

Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 262 (emphases added).

171

See id. at 268.
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This view of the Fourteenth Amendment protecting citizenship and prohibiting
denationalization is rooted in the concept of popular sovereignty.172 Chief Justice
Warren first approached this idea in his pivotal dissenting opinion in Perez. He
recognized that the people had created a government endowed with broad powers;
however, he believed that “the citizens themselves are sovereign, and their
citizenship is not subject to the general powers of their government.”173 Regardless
of the powers of Congress to regulate citizens’ conduct, “a government of the people
cannot take away their citizenship simply because one branch of that government can
be said to have a conceivably rational basis for wanting to do so.”174 In Afroyim, the
Supreme Court adopted Chief Justice Warren’s dissent as its majority opinion, thus
establishing the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment places citizenship outside
the power of Congress.175
Based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s unambiguous protection of citizenship,
both Warren’s Perez dissent and Afroyim specifically reject the idea that Congress
has any power, express or implied, to denationalize.176 The Constitution “grants
Congress no express power to strip people of their citizenship, whether in the
exercise of the implied power to regulate foreign affairs or in the exercise of any
specifically granted power.”177 Following this principle, any attempt by the
government through Patriot Act II to revive denationalization based on the power of
protecting national security or the war power would be unconstitutional.178
The drafters of Patriot Act II have sought to avoid the implication of
denationalization by stating in their proposal that Section 501 would merely add
“joining or providing material support to a terrorist organization” to the list of
expatriating acts.179 If, however, Congress is officially presented with Patriot Act II
it should consider the purpose behind this proposal. The Department of Justice has
said that Patriot Act II will be an “additional tool to protect the American people.”180
This goes beyond the formal recognition of a citizen’s voluntary renouncement of
citizenship to using denationalization as a weapon in the war on terror.181 Further
evidence that Patriot Act II goes beyond expatriating to denationalizing in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment is shown by Section 501’s reduction of the
government’s burden to prove intent.182
172
See Perez, 356 U.S. at 65 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268
(describing the foundation of the United States saying that “citizenry is the country and the
country is its citizenry”).
173

Perez, 356 U.S. at 65 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).

174

Id. (emphasis in original).

175

Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253.

176

See Perez, 356 U.S. at 66 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.

177

Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.

178

See Perez, 356 U.S. at 77-78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.

179

See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.

180

See Statement of Barbara Comstock, Director of Public Affairs, supra note 147.

181

See generally Mariner, supra note 9.

182

See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.
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B. Patriot Act II Improperly Reduces the Government’s Burden
to Prove “Intent to Relinquish” Citizenship
Patriot Act II violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of citizens from
denationalization by amending the Immigration and Nationality Act to specifically
provide that committing the expatriating act of “joining or providing material support
to a terrorist organization” is prima facie evidence that the act was done with the
intent to relinquish United States citizenship. Patriot Act II should be recognized as
unconstitutional because of its attempt to overcome the requirement that, for an act
to be expatriating, a citizen must intend to renounce citizenship.183 By establishing
that an act in and of itself is prima facie evidence of intent, Patriot Act II alleviates
the government’s burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that a citizen had
the intent to relinquish citizenship.184 By creating the presumption that conduct alone
can be conclusive evidence of an intent to relinquish citizenship, Patriot Act II has
rejected clear Supreme Court precedent and has crossed the line from recognizing
expatriation to denationalization.185 Without a clear intent on the part of the citizen
to relinquish his citizenship, any act by the government to revoke that citizenship is
denationalization, not expatriation.186
In Afroyim, the Supreme Court established the governing principle that Congress
has no power under the Constitution to unilaterally strip people of their citizenship.187
Essential to the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of citizenship is the principle
that a citizen retains his citizenship unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.188 In
Terrazas, the Court expanded its view and pronounced that expatriation requires
both a voluntary act and an intent to relinquish citizenship through the act.189 The
Court then established that the burden is on the government to prove such intent by a
preponderance of the evidence.190 In making this ruling, the Court firmly rejected the
idea that the government could use committing an expatriating act as a presumption
of an intent to renounce citizenship.191 The Court stated that “we are confident that it
would be inconsistent with Afroyim to treat the expatriating acts specified in
§ 1481(a) as the equivalent of or as conclusive evidence of the indispensable
voluntary assent of the citizen.”192

183

See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268.

184

See generally Mariner, supra note 9 (addressing the serious concern raised by inferring
intent to relinquish citizenship from conduct).
185

See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268.

186

See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).

187

See id.

188

Id. at 268.

189

Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 260. The Court stated that such intent can be “expressed in words
or . . . found as a fair inference from proved conduct.” Id.
190

Id. at 268.

191

Id. at 260-61.

192

Id. at 261.
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The Court denied the government the right to infer intent based solely on conduct
because it is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment:
[T]he intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, among other things, was to
define citizenship; and as interpreted in Afroyim, that definition cannot
coexist with a congressional power to specify acts that work a
renunciation of citizenship even absent an intent to renounce. In the last
analysis, expatriation depends on the will of the citizen rather than on the
will of Congress and its assessment of his conduct.193
Although the Court stated that any of the specified expatriating acts “may be highly
persuasive evidence in the particular case of a purpose to abandon citizenship,”194 the
Court resolved that “the trier of fact must in the end conclude that the citizen not
only voluntarily committed to expatriating act prescribed by statute, but also
intended to relinquish his citizenship.”195 Further, the burden is on the government to
prove intent by a preponderance of the evidence.196
Patriot Act II clearly contradicts this precedent by seeking to establish that
joining or providing material support to a terrorist organization is prima facie
evidence of an intent to relinquish United States citizenship.197 Any attempts by the
government to create a presumption of intent to relinquish citizenship shifts the
burden of proof to the citizen, forcing him to prove that he did not have such intent
to save his citizenship. This would allow the government to denationalize citizens if
they are unable to overcome the presumption of intent and demonstrate that they did
not intend to relinquish citizenship.198 Critics of Patriot Act II have pointed to the
difficulties that citizens may have in overcoming the presumption of intent due to
courts’ recent deference to the government’s “factual assessments” relating to
terrorism.199 Patriot Act II’s proposal to alleviate the government’s burden to prove
intent to relinquish citizenship is inconsistent with the standard set in Terrazas, and
is, therefore, unconstitutional.200

193

Id. at 260.

194

Id. at 261 (quoting Nishikawa, 356 U.S. at 139 (Black, J., concurring)).

195

Id.

196

Id. at 268.

197
See Patriot Act II, supra note 10. Notably, Section 501 specifically singles out “joining
or providing material support to terrorists” and serving in foreign army engaged in hostilities
with the United States to be the only acts that would be considered prima facie evidence of
intent to relinquish citizenship, while leaving the evidentiary standard for all the other
established expatriating acts listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act unchanged. Id.
This raises the question of why the act of joining or providing material support to a terrorist
group would be presumptive of an intent to relinquish citizenship while all of the other longstanding expatriating acts are not.
198

See generally Mariner, supra note 9.

199

Id.

200

See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss4/7

22

2004-05]

PATRIOT ACT II AND DENATIONALIZATION

615

C. Patriot Act II’s Use of Denationalization as a Punishment
is Unconstitutional Under the Eighth Amendment
Beyond its violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by attempting to strip
Americans of their citizenship without their assent, Patriot Act II is also
unconstitutional because it uses denationalization as a punishment. In Trop v.
Dulles, the Supreme Court held that statutes which provide for denationalization as a
punishment are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.201 In reaching its
decision, the Court again emphasized the value of citizenship and concluded that
“the deprivation of citizenship is not a weapon that the Government may use to
express its displeasure at a citizen’s conduct, however reprehensible that conduct
may be.”202 An examination of Section 501 of Patriot Act II shows that the purpose
of this legislation is to punish citizens that are convicted of terrorist acts.203 Such
legislation is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and should not be enacted.
Because the Eighth Amendment only applies to statutes that impose penalties, the
Trop Court first examined what makes a statute penal in nature.204 The Court stated
that the inquiry should be directed at the substance of the statute rather than its form,
and a statute that appears to be a regulation on its face cannot avoid scrutiny simply
because it is labeled as “non-penal.”205 The test for determining whether or not a law
is penal is based on “the purpose of the statute. If the statute imposes a disability for
the purposes of punishment – that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others,
etc. – it [is] considered penal.”206 The statute in question in Trop provided that a
person would lose his citizenship for conviction of wartime desertion.207 Applying
this test, the Court concluded that the purpose of the statute was simply to punish the
convicted deserter and, therefore, the statute was a penal law.208
Evaluating Section 501 of Patriot Act II under this test evinces that it is a punitive
measure and should be treated as such. The drafters of this proposed legislation have
not commented on their purpose for seeking to denationalize terrorists other than
vague assertions of protecting national security.209 A study of this proposal in
201

356 U.S. 86.

202

See id. at 92-93.

203

See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.

204

See Trop, 356 U.S. at 95.

205

Id. at 94-95.

206

Trop, 356 U.S. at 96. In another case involving denationalization as a punishment,
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Court provided a series of factors that can be considered
in determining if a statute is punitive including: (1) whether the sanction involves an
affirmative disability or restraint, (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, (4) whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment – retribution and deterrence, (5)
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, (6) whether an alternative purpose
to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and (7) whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purposed assigned. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
207

See Trop, 356 U.S. at 88.

208

Id. at 97.

209

See Statement of Barbara Comstock, Director of Public Affairs, supra note 147.
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context, however, leads to the reasonable conclusion that its purpose is to provide
another method to punish those convicted of terrorist acts and not some other
legitimate purpose. First, terrorism and providing material support to terrorists are
already crimes that are subject to severe penalties.210 By adding denationalization as
another penalty, the government seeks to add further punishment to citizens that have
already been convicted of a crime.211 This is similar to the statute that was struck
down as unconstitutional in Trop. Second, the majority of the expatriating acts listed
in the Immigration and Nationality Act have a regulatory purpose and are used to
clarify a person’s citizenship status when he or she has transferred allegiance to
another country.212 In contrast, Patriot Act II revokes citizenship from Americans
that are connected to terrorist groups rather than to any foreign country.213 Thus,
there is serious doubt as to any legitimate regulatory purpose behind the proposal.
Finally, Section 501 should be considered not just individually, but also in the
context of Patriot Act II as a whole. It is important to note that Section 501 is
inserted among a series of other sections that propose numerous increases in criminal
penalties related to terrorism.214 For example, Section 501 is immediately followed
by Section 502: Enhanced Criminal Penalties for Violations of Immigration and
Nationality Act.215 In this context, it is clear that Patriot Act II is using
denationalization as a punitive measure to punish citizens who are connected to
terrorists organizations. Because Patriot Act II uses denationalization as a
punishment it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.216
The Court in Trop interpreted the Eighth Amendment and concluded that “the
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man.”217 The Court held that denationalization is a cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment because it creates “the total destruction of the
210

18 U.S.C. §§ 2332, 2339A (2003).

211

See generally Mariner, supra note 9.

212

See John P. Roche, The Expatriation Cases: “Breathes There the Man, With Soul So
Dead . . . ?”, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 325, 337 (1963). Roche states that the government has used
two categories of expatriating acts. One category provides for loss of citizenship for
Americans who have shifted their allegiance to a foreign country and the other category based
on punishing “Bad Americans” by depriving them of citizenship. Id.
213

This would include both domestic and international terrorist organizations. See Patriot
Act II, supra note 10.
214

See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.

215

Id. Other examples of sections proposing increased penalties include among several
others: Section 411: Penalties for terrorist murders; Section 421: Increased Penalties for
Terrorist Financing; Section 424: Denial of Federal Benefits to Terrorists; and Section 503:
Inadmissibility and Removability of National Security Aliens or Criminally Charged Aliens.
Id.
216

Trop, 356 U.S. at 103.

217

Id. at 100. The court recognized that the government does have the power to punish,
even with death, but that this does not mean that any punishment less is acceptable: “[I]t is
equally plain that the existence of the death penalty is not a license to the Government to
devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagination . . . any technique
outside the bounds of [the] traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect. Id. at 99-100.
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individual’s status in organized society.”218 The Court based its decision on its
contempt for the statelessness that may result from denationalization and its belief in
the priceless value of citizenship.219 A brief study of the concerns of the Trop Court
relating to statelessness and the value of citizenship shows that Patriot Act II would
have serious negative impacts in both of these areas. Thus, an Eighth Amendment
ban on Patriot Act II’s use of denationalization as punishment is well founded.
1. The Problem of Statelessness
By revoking citizenship from Americans who are connected to terrorist groups,
Patriot Act II has the potential to create a serious problem of statelessness.
Statelessness is “the legal condition of being without a nationality.”220 It results
when a citizen losses his nationality without acquiring a new nationality.221 While
other expatriating acts provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act are generally
used as a way to transfer a citizen’s allegiance from one country to another, Patriot
Act II’s proposal to use denationalization as a punishment for terrorism may revoke
citizenship of Americans who have no ties to any foreign country.222 This will leave
these citizens as stateless and treated as aliens in their own country.223
In Trop, the Court firmly denounced the use of denationalization as a punishment
that creates stateless persons, considering such punishment to be “offensive to
cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands.”224 The Court contemplated
the perilous situation that is faced by the stateless person:
His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens
to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights, and
presumably as long as he remained in this country he would enjoy the
limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is stateless.
Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be
subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short, the
expatriate has lost the right to have rights.225
The Court believed that the never-ending fear and distress that is caused by
statelessness makes it a cruel and unusual punishment.226 Further, even if a stateless
person never faces any of these consequences, the threat alone “makes the
punishment obnoxious.”227
218

Id. at 101.

219

Id. at 101-02.

220

See Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to
an Effective Nationality Under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1141, 1176 (1998).
221

Id. at 1177.

222

See Patriot Act II, supra note 10.

223

See Gordon, supra note 150, at 346.

224

Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.

225

Id. at 101-02.

226

Id. at 102.

227

Id.
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Not only has American law rejected the creation of statelessness, but
international law also vehemently opposes such a condition.228 While some have
questioned the gravity of a stateless person’s loss of citizenship,229 statelessness has
been a serious problem around the world with stateless persons facing violations of
their basic human rights.230 In its Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations
has announced its position against statelessness by declaring that “everyone has the
right to a nationality” and that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality.”231 Patriot Act II’s attempt to revive denationalization runs contrary to
both the United States and the International community’s condemnation of creating
statelessness.
The idea that denationalization causes a citizen to become “a man without a
country” is a major contributing factor in the Court’s conclusion that
denationalization is a cruel and unusual punishment.232 Patriot Act II has the clear
potential to render Americans stateless by revoking their citizenship for terrorism
when they have not transferred allegiance to any foreign country.233 This supports
the conclusion that it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and
unusual punishment.
2. The Value of Citizenship
The Court’s decision in Trop that denationalization is a cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment is rooted in the idea that citizenship is a
person’s most valuable, fundamental right.234 The Court considers citizenship to be
the equivalent to a person’s social and political identity.235 Denationalization is a
cruel and unusual punishment because it is the “total destruction of the individual’s
228

See Spectar, supra note 23, at 295-96.

229

See Gordon, supra note 150, at 346. Gordon questions the impact that a change in a
person’s status to stateless would really have and states that the main loss of rights would be
loss of the right to vote, to hold public office, to work in certain professions and to face
deportation. Id.
230

See Spectar, supra note 23, at 296.

231

Id. at 297 (quoting the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see
also, Blackman, supra note 220, at 1178.
232
In Afroyim, the Court also addressed its concern about the potential for
denationalization to create statelessness. 387 U.S. at 268. The Court stated that “[i]n some
instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left without the protection of citizenship
in any country in the world – as a man without a country.” Id.
233
It is important to reemphasize that Patriot Act II makes no distinction between domestic
and foreign terrorist organizations, and the definition for terrorism that it uses is incredibly
broad. See Patriot Act II, supra note 10. This may lead to targeting citizens who are involved
in domestic political or activist groups that are disfavored by the government being labeled as
terrorists and, thus, facing denationalization even though there is no connection to a foreign
country. See Edgar, supra note 114, at 6.
234
Trop, 356 U.S. 86. Chief Justice Warren stated that “[w]hen the Government acts to
take away the fundamental right of citizenship, the safeguards of the Constitution should be
examined with special diligence.” Id. at 103.
235

Id. at 101.
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status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture,
for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the
development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and
international political community.”236 The use of denationalization to take away, in
essence, a person’s societal existence ignores the “basic concept underlying the Eight
Amendment [which] is nothing less than the dignity of man” and is, thus, a cruel and
unusual punishment.237
The concern over protecting citizenship because it is a most precious right has
been the prevailing theme throughout the Court’s decisions prohibiting
denationalization.238 In his dissent in Perez, which has been adopted as the opinion
of the Court, Chief Justice Warren described citizenship as “the constitutional
birthright of every person born in this country” and as “man’s basic right for it is
nothing less than the right to have rights. Remove this priceless possession and there
remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen.”239
In Afroyim, the Court reiterated the fundamental basic value of citizenship stating
that it “is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so
under the mane of one of its general or implied grants of power.”240 This concept of
citizenship as man’s basic right is supported by both the theoretical and historical
interpretations of citizenship.241
Despite the overwhelming recognition for the fundamental value of citizenship,
there has been some speculation as to the real harm that Americans would face if
they have their citizenship revoked.242 It has been suggested that Chief Justice
Warren’s characterization of citizenship “is a dramatic overstatement of the

236

Id.

237

Id. at 100.

238

See id.; Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253; Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 268 . See also Griffith, supra note
17, at 453-54 (discussing how the concern in the expatriation cases centered on the extent of
protection that was to be provided for the basic right of citizenship).
239

Perez, 356 U.S. at 66 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren’s concern for the
value of citizenship is connected to the plight of the stateless person, who “has no lawful claim
to protection from any nation, and no nation may assert rights on his behalf.” Id.
240

Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267-68.

241

See Gordon, supra note 150, at 316. In considering the meaning of citizenship, Gordon
states:
Citizenship is a somewhat nebulous term, with roots deep in antiquity. It is a
generalization which denotes full membership in the clan, the state or the society. To
most of us such membership is a proud and comforting possession . . . . Citizenship
confers a status which summons rights, privileges and obligations, and in a society as
powerful and beneficent as that of the United States, this may be a status of
inestimable value. The manner in which such status can be lost, or in which the
citizen can be deprived of it, obviously is a matter of crucial concern to all.
Id. See also Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1484-98 (analyzing several perspectives on
citizenship including a citizenship under a “rights” perspective).
242
See Gordon, supra note 150, at 346. Gordon questions the real gravity of
denationalized citizens’ loss, and suggests that the characterizations of the harm they face may
be too extreme. Id.
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importance of citizenship in the United States today.”243 This argument views
citizenship as just a title, the loss of which has no real impact because aliens in the
United States are provided many of the same rights as citizens.244
Citizenship is still a valuable right for all Americans that needs to be protected
from attempts by the government to revoke citizenship.245 That a person’s status as
an American citizen is still incredibly important is evident through the current
situation involving the detention of enemy combatants in connection with the war on
terror.246 Patriot Act II’s attempt to revoke Americans’ citizenship in the name of
national security has renewed the need to recognize citizenship as Americans’ most
fundamental and precious right.247
Patriot Act II’s attempt to revive allowing the government to denationalize
citizens for any connection to a terrorist group has raised serious concerns about the
real purpose behind this proposal.248 It is important to consider why the government
is attempting to assert the power to strip Americans of their citizenship for
involvement with a terrorist organization when such acts are already subject to
severe criminal penalties.249 Critics of Patriot Act II have suggested that the real
purpose behind this proposal is that by giving the government the power to
denationalize citizens, they will then have the power to deport or indefinitely detain
these individuals who will then be treated as aliens.250
243

See Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1486.

244

See Gordon, supra note 150, at 346; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 24, at 1486 (stating
that aliens are entitled to the majority of benefits of citizens, but also recognizing certain
benefits provided solely to citizens such as the ability to travel on a U.S. passport, the right to
receive protection from the U.S. government overseas, the right to vote and the right to hold
office).
245

See generally Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9; Hetnoff, supra note

114.
246

As part of the war on terrorism, the government has been detaining over six hundred
men who are suspected of being enemy combatants of the United States. See Bill Mears,
Supreme Court Will Hear First Appeals involving Guantanamo Detainees, CNN Washington
Bureau (Nov. 11, 2003) available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/10/scotus.detainees/
(last visited Feb.19, 2004). There has been a great debate about the legal protection that such
enemy combatants should receive. Initially, courts have denied access to the alien
Guantanamo Bay detainees, holding that the United States has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
habeas corpus for aliens that are detained outside the sovereignty of the United States. See
Khaled A. F. al Ohah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). However, the
American terrorist suspects, Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi, as American citizens, have been
granted access to the legal system. In Padilla’s case, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit granted a writ of habeas corpus. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
This situation shows that status as a citizen is of vital importance to those who are accused by
the government of involvement in terrorism. This has been suggested as a reason why the
government wants the power to revoke citizenship. See Mariner, supra note 9.
247

See generally Lewis & Mayle, supra note 1; Mariner, supra note 9; Hetnoff, supra note

114.
248

Hetnoff, supra note 114.

249

See Mariner, supra note 9.

250

See Hetnoff, supra note 114; Edgar, supra note 114.
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Patriot Act II is attempting to use denationalization as a weapon in the war on
terror by punishing citizens who are connected to terrorist groups.251 This goes
against the clear statement in Trop that “the deprivation of citizenship is not a
weapon that the Government may use” against citizens.252 The value of citizenship is
still recognized by the Constitution, which protects it from being taken by the
government.253 Thus, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Patriot Act II’s
proposal to allow the government to strip Americans of their citizenship for
connection to a terrorist group should be recognized as unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
After the leak of Patriot Act II to the public by the Center for Public Integrity, the
Department of Justice released a statement claiming that its deliberations in
considering new anti-terrorism measures “are always undertaken with the strongest
commitment to our Constitution and civil liberties.”254 Section 501, however, clearly
seeks to overcome the constitutional prohibition against denationalization and revive
stripping Americans of their citizenship in the name of national security and the war
on terrorism.
A review of the history of denationalization in America has shown that any past
deference to Congress regarding revocation of citizenship without the citizen’s
assent has been replaced by a full protection of Americans from denationalization.
The Supreme Court has declared that denationalization is unconstitutional under both
the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. Section 501 of Patriot Act II violates both
of these amendments because it seeks to revoke citizenship from Americans who
have no intention to relinquish their citizenship and it uses this denationalization as a
punishment against those persons that the government finds have a connection to
terrorism.
Citizenship remains Americans’ most fundamental right, and citizens should
continue to receive full protection as demanded by the Constitution. If Congress is
presented with Patriot Act II in its present form, it should reject Section 501 as an
unconstitutional attempt to revive denationalization.
NORA GRAHAM255
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See Statement of Barbara Comstock, Director of Public Affairs, supra note 147. The
Department of Justice refers to this proposal as a “tool” to protect Americans. Id.
252

Trop, 356 U.S. at 92-93.

253

See id.; Afroyim, 387 U.S. 253.

254

See Statement of Barbara Comstock, Director of Public Affairs, supra note 147.
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